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Abstract 
The Australian Government has produced a CO2-equivalent tax proposal with a 
difference, it is a short prelude to an emission trading scheme that will allow the 
increasing rate of emissions to continue, while being a net cost to the Treasury.  That 
cost extends to allowing major emitters to make guaranteed windfall profits from 
pollution permits.  The emission trading scheme suffers numerous problems, but the 
issues raised show taxes can also be watered down and made ineffectual through 
concessions.  Taxpayers will get no assets from the billions of dollars to be spent 
buying-off the coal generators or other polluters.  The scheme hopes to stimulate 
private investors to create an additional 12 percent in renewable electricity generation 
by 2020.  A serious emissions reducing alternative would be to create a nationalised 
electricity sector with 100 percent renewable energy within a decade.  We explore the 
difficulties of implementing meaningful greenhouse gas taxes in Australia. 
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Since they were proposed at the start of the 19th Century, pollution taxes have been 
part of the economist’s tool kit for internalizing the social costs of environmental 
damages.  The aim of a tax on air pollutants is to reduce atmospheric concentrations 
by creating a cost charged for emissions and an incentive to use environmental 
resources more efficiently.  Thus, for greenhouse gases (GHGs) a tax should penalise 
polluters, provide an incentive for lowering the GHG intensity of energy production 
and consumption, and raise social welfare by avoiding social and environmental 
damages that would otherwise occur. 
Yet such taxes have often proven politically controversial and hard to 
implement (Christiansen and Wettestad 2003).  In the area of public policy on climate 
change this has led to a preference for emissions trading due to its supposed 
competitive market like qualities (Lohmann 2006), and despite that approach having 
even more serious problems than taxes (Spash 2010).  This has also led to the 
language of the market being used inappropriately as a rhetorical device.  Rather than 
the term ‘tax’ a neo-liberally more acceptable term ‘price’ is increasingly employed, 
as if the idea were to establish a market rather than a government regulated charge. 
In Australia, the rejection of an emissions trading scheme (ETS) and a failed 
attempt to tax profits in the mining sector led to the downfall of the Labour 
Government under Kevin Rudd and an internal party coup by Julia Gillard in favour 
of mining interests.  Now the Labour Government under Gillard, in coalition with the 
Greens, has proposed a means of making polluters pay which is meant to steer 
through the political minefield.  The official proposal states: "For the first three years, 
the carbon price will be fixed like a tax, before moving to an emissions trading 
scheme in 2015" (Australian Government 2011, p.vii).  Official documents and media 
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communications have been carefully crafted to avoid the unpopular name tax in 
preference for price.  However, in a major speech to the National Press Club, the 
Prime Minister stated this was a “temporary carbon tax” (Gillard 2011) and the 
Treasurer, in response to media questioning on the design, has had to admit “that 
[design] is a carbon tax, that is true” (Swan 2011).  The Minister for Climate Change 
and Energy Efficiency has also referred to the scheme as a “carbon tax for a short 
period of time” (Combet 2011). 
The reason for this sensitivity is that a serious GHG emissions tax would 
impact across society and it would need to do so to be effective.  If action is deemed 
necessary then it must be sufficient to address the problem and that means stabilising 
global GHGs in the upper atmosphere.  Australia, as the highest per capita source of 
CO2 emission,i is actually committed by Kyoto Protocol to increasing emissions by 8 
percent over 1990 levels.ii  Even this it has failed to achieve and now is merely 
limiting itself to reducing the rate of increase by choosing a base of 5 percent 
reductions on 2000 levels.  As such the targets have been extremely minimal 
compared to the 80 percent emissions reductions on 1990 levels stated as needed by 
2050 in order to stand a chance of avoiding temperature rises above 2ºC (Parry et al. 
2008).  Yet the pretence remains that GHGs can be controlled sufficiently without 
disturbing the current economic system, that growth can be maintained as usual and 
some straight forward market pricing will provide the answer to the threat from 
human induced climate change. 
In this article we review and assess the economics of the GHG taxation, 
pricing and regulation policy debate in Australia.  The next section addresses the 
theoretical promise of a taxation approach to pollution.  We then turn to the 
Australian scheme and discuss how it weights-up against the expected benefits of a 
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normal pollution tax and why it appears set to be ineffective, highly costly and mainly 
of financial benefit to big polluters.  This leads into a discussion section where we 
explore what is needed to change Australia to a low GHG emissions economy and 
how this might be achieved within a decade.  Our conclusions emphasise the need for 
a move away from the current approach dominated by market rhetoric and appeasing 
powerful polluters and corporate interest groups and towards taxation designed to 
fund structural change and create public assets not private profits. 
 
Advantages of and Challenges for a GHG Tax 
Pollution is conceptualized in economic theory as a minor aberration on an otherwise 
perfectly functioning market system (Spash 2010).  A defining principle of welfare 
economics, originating in the work of Arthur Pigou (1921), is that public policy 
should involve estimation of the social damages of negative externalities in monetary 
terms, and subsequent imposition of a tax to correct such market price failures.  In 
theory, otherwise unregulated markets can then be left to find the optimum quantity 
for the production of traded commodities.  Such a Pigouvian tax policy requires that 
firms, whose economic activities have shifted costs onto society, should pay for the 
damages they cause. 
For the case of human induced climate change GHGs are emitted into the 
atmosphere without cost to the polluter but the resulting damages from climate change 
will be borne by a wide range of victims across time and space (Spash 2002).  GHG 
taxation aims to correct this market failure by making the value of social damages 
internal to the polluters decisions.  The approach has been advocated by 
environmental economists as addressing reduction of GHGs to an efficient level while 
avoiding major disruption to economic systems (Oates 1995, Pearce 1991, Tietenberg 
5 
 
1990).  That efficient level is one where the monetary costs involved in achieving 
regulation are weighed against the monetary benefits of avoiding pollution damages.  
However, calculating those monetary costs and benefits for human induced climate 
change, especially in the detail required by economic theory, is impossible (Spash 
2002), and all attempts to do so merely result in rhetoric and conjecture (Spash 2007). 
In this regard, and politically, a major problem for achieving GHG control is 
the absence of victims because, unlike many other pollutants, the damages are 
expected ones that will occur in the future.  In addition, the cause-effect relationships 
are complex making any change in climatic events (e.g. increase in frequency or scale 
of storms, droughts or floods) hard to recognise and link directly to human induced 
climate forcing.  The fear amongst those who take the problem seriously is that this 
will remain the case until such events become overwhelming and so the opportunity 
to avoid the problem has been lost. 
A further complication for an economically efficient regulation aiming to 
control human induced climate change is the fact that several different emissions 
contribute to the problem.  Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2) 
contribute about half the human induced climate forcing.  The other half is due to a 
variety of human emissions of GHGs, such as methane, nitrous oxide, 
chlorofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbon, hydrofluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride.  
Economic efficiency requires that GHG control should relate to the most net cost-
effective source first.  The regulatory approach in this regard has generally been to 
calculate everything in the same terms and to convert all GHGs into CO2-equivalent 
emissions.  This is not a straight forward calculation but rather requires taking into 
account such things as transmission to the upper atmosphere, the expected life of 
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gases in the upper atmosphere, and their potential for trapping ultra-violet radiation 
(i.e., contributing to the greenhouse effect). 
Where pollution emissions are directly related to an input (i.e., factor of 
production) in the industrial process, choosing to levy a tax on either emissions or a 
production input can be equally effective.  Thus taxation on coal could be undertaken 
instead of taxation on emissions from coal fired power stations.  For CO2 emissions 
this requires knowing the correspondence between fossil fuel combustion and 
emissions into the atmosphere after combustion.  While, again, not a straight forward 
calculation—subject to the input quality, treatment and combustion technology 
involved—the tendency has become to talk of a carbon tax, rather than CO2-
equivalent emissions tax. 
Some gases (e.g., chlorofluorocarbons) are hundreds of thousands times more 
powerful at forcing climate than CO2 but may be produced in relatively small 
quantities and are artificially constructed (i.e. synthetic) rather than naturally 
occurring.  In these cases a straight forward ban would be the most effective way to 
remove the emissions.  However, the rise of neo-liberalism has made such direct 
regulation, and use of government power, politically unpopular and raised the goal of 
efficiency above effectiveness.  Industrial producers may emphasize that the 
possibilities for substitution are few and the costs (in jobs and profits) to the economy 
high, while they demand government not intervene in the supposedly efficient free 
market system.  Thus a political negotiation occurs in which, at best, a nominal charge 
may be levied while major polluters are made exempt from, or given financial 
rewards for, complying with taxation.  This of course does not address the pollution 
problem of concern. 
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Despite these problems, GHG taxation is considered to be a robust public 
policy measure for several reasons.  According to Ekins and Barker (2001), such a tax: 
1) tackles an accepted economic problem, i.e. a damaging externality; 
2) generates revenues that are expected to grow with income; 
3) tends to be simple and cheap to administer; 
4) can stimulate energy savings, innovation and investment in clean 
technology and so economic growth; 
5) is likely to have minimal regressive side-effects allowing 
compensation using a small fraction of the expected revenues.iii 
GHG taxation has also been described as being able to achieve a “double dividend”.  
The double dividend hypothesis refers to simultaneously: (i) lowering the costs of 
pollution control via innovation and (ii) reducing the overall economic costs 
associated with the tax system (Goulder 1995, Oates 1995, Parry 2001).  Let us 
consider each claim in turn. 
From the perspective of neoclassical economics, development of completely 
new technologies is driven by expected profits.  Businesses are rational investors, and 
the size of their investment depends on the opportunity cost of capital and the 
expected return from research and development (IPCC 2001).  Technological 
improvements are seen to occur continually through the accumulation of knowledge 
capital and selection of better techniques in response to a changing economic and 
legislative context.  Carbon taxes are viewed as a continuous incentive to adopt ever 
cleaner technology (Pearce 1991).  The first dividend of GHG taxation hinges upon 
the existence of such a positive relationship between price and technical innovation, 




The first dividend also relies upon a higher cost, for GHG intensive energy 
generation and products, encouraging profit-seeking firms and budget constrained 
households to look towards more energy-efficient production and consumption.  The 
expectation is that a tax will stimulate lower cost alternatives and the development of 
new low-carbon technologies.  This assumes that the rate and direction of technical 
innovation respond to changes in demand and relative factor prices (Löschel 2002).  
There appears to be some published support for the claim at an aggregate level.  Popp 
(2002) analyzed patent data from 1970-1994 and argued that energy prices have had 
strong and significant effects on patenting in the field of alternative energy and energy 
efficiency.  Jaffe and Stavins (1995) also observed a positive and significant response 
of mean energy efficiency to energy price changes. 
However, others question the potential of market forces to stimulate technical 
innovation.  For example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, (IPCC) 
recognises the potential but also notes that innovation is not a linear process from 
research and development through to demonstration and deployment (IPCC, 2001 
p.355).  As Mokyr (1991) explains, radical innovations and wholesale reorganization 
of the techno-economic structure are less responsive to price signals than incremental 
innovations.  Economic incentives inadequately address the issues of long timeframes 
and considerable uncertainty involved in the invention of new carbon-free 
technologies.  This is why the role of pricing as the primary policy instrument for 
advancing this kind of technology is considered to be limited (Galiana and Green 
2010).  Thus, there is a need to prioritise and employ off-the-shelf technologies and 
approaches which can have an impact in the next decade, e.g. energy conservation and 
efficient use, solar thermal, wind power, passive solar heating, demand reduction 
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(Diesendorf 2011).  This also means the technological dividend may be 
overemphasised. 
The second dividend relates to the generation of government revenues.  A tax 
is revenue-neutral if the monies raised are completely returned to the economy via 
cutting other taxes or making lump-sum rebates (revenue recycling).  This means the 
government's budgetary position would remain unchanged.  Net economic gains are 
possible when these revenues are used to reduce or replace distortionary taxes placed 
on what are regarded as economic goods (as opposed to bads) such as labour and 
capital (Baranzini et al. 2000, Ekins and Barker 2001, Goulder 1995, Parry 2001).  As 
Parry (2001 p.122) states the removal of distortionary taxes on income and investment 
means: “The rewards for working as opposed to not working and for saving as 
opposed to consuming are increased, thereby encouraging more employment and 
investment”.  A revenue-neutral tax can lower the costs of the tax system and thus 
produce an economic (and non-environmental) benefit.  This is regarded as the 
strongest argument in favour of a tax compared to an ETS, which generates less 
public income iv  (Humphreys 2007).  The stability of government revenues also 
disappears under an ETS where market price volatility operates, speculation occurs 
and free permits are issued instead of being auctioned.  The second dividend depends 
on its ability to displace pre-existing taxes or subsidies that cause inefficiencies.  Thus, 
savings are more likely to arise if markets are already seriously distorted, e.g. labour 
is subject to over taxation relative to capital (Baranzini, Goldemberg and Speck 2000, 
Weyant 1998). 
A substantial decline in the revenues from a fiscally neutral environmental tax 
would threaten the ability to replace revenues from distortionary taxes.  Revenue 
flows therefore have to be non-declining (i.e., stable or rising) in order to sustain the 
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economic pre-commitments to reducing other tax revenue flows and hence achieve 
political acceptability.  This is rarely considered to be an issue, because emissions are 
expected to be on an indefinite rising trend and tax revenues are expected to follow 
(Ekins and Barker 2001).  This is a questionable assumption for GHG emission 
because the aim should be to cut them drastically (i.e. by 80 percent) if the scheme is 
to have the promised effect of stabilising concentrations in the upper atmosphere.  The 
long term revenue stream would then be related only to the remaining 20 percent of 
emissions. 
 
The Australian Experience 
Australia is the highest per capita emitter of CO2 globally (Australian Government 
2011).  Under the Kyoto Protocol, the country is allowed to increase its GHG 
emissions by 8 percent above 1990 levels (418.3 MtCO2-e).  By 2009, its GHG 
emissions had already reached 545.8 MtCO2-e (Department of Climate Change and 
Energy Efficiency 2011).  This was an increase of around 30 percent over 1990 levels.  
The Government has now pledged to unilaterally reduce its CO2-equivalent emissions 
5 percent from 2000 levels (496.1 MtCO2- equivalent) by 2020, but might increase 
this to 15 percent or 25 percent in the context of global action (Australian 
Government 2011).  The latest scheme will cover four of the six GHGs included 
under the Kyoto Protocol—CO2, methane and nitrous oxide from stationary energy, 
waste, rail, domestic aviation and shipping, industrial processes and fugitive 
emissions, and perfluorocarbon emissions from the aluminium sector (Australian 
Government 2011 p.27-28). 
The Labour Government had previously proposed a national ETS known as 
the “Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme” (CPRS) (Australian Government 2008).  
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Under the CPRS, emission permits would have been freely allocated to major 
polluters and trade-exposed industries, up to 95 percent and 66 percent of historic 
benchmark emissions (grandfathering).  Coal-fired electricity generators would have 
received a one-off amount of free permits and the electricity generating industry as a 
whole was expected to benefit by A$7.2 billion.  The CPRS allowed purchase of 
unlimited quantities of Kyoto emissions credits from overseas, a fact which would 
have meant little or no domestic reductions.  The proposal disappointed economists 
for varying reasons (Jotzo and Betz 2009, Spash 2010).  Ross Garnaut, who originally 
recommended the cap-and-trade framework to the Labour Government, condemned 
the CPRS as “an overly generous deal for business” secured by “a massive lobbying 
exercise by vested interests” (Herald Sun 2008).  Despite polarization of public 
opinion the CPRS managed to gain support from the majority (58 percent) of 
Australians (Pietsch and McAllister 2010).  In parliament, the Australian Greens 
opposed the lenient targets, while the opposition Liberal Party expressed considerable 
concern over the potential job losses and negative economic impact.  In November 
2009, despite public support, the CPRS was withdrawn after being voted down for a 
second time in the Senate.  The Government decided to permanently delay further 
attempts at introduction rather than call a dissolution and fight the issue in an election 
campaign. 
This major policy failure damaged the reputation of the then Prime Minister, 
Kevin Rudd, who led the CPRS campaign.  After following this with a failed attempt 
to get a tax on mining he was forced by his own party to relinquish his office in June 
2010.  The Leader of the Opposition, who opposed any GHG tax or price, almost won 
the ensuing federal election, which resulted in a hung parliament.  The incumbent 
Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, managed to form a minority government supported by 
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Greens and Independents.  In July 2010, she had called for a high-profile “citizens’ 
assembly” as part of her election promise to gain community consensus on a GHG 
mitigation policy.  However, after the elections, the “citizens’ assembly” concept was 
abandoned. Instead a Multi-Party Climate Change Committee—including Greens and 
Independents, the opposition declining to take part—was given the task of producing 
a policy response to Australia's ever increasing GHG emissions (The Australian 2010). 
In July 2011 this committee launched its centrepiece, the “Clean Energy Plan” 
(CEP) (Australian Government 2011).  This is an energy policy package including 
elements of a CO2-equivalent tax aimed at meeting minimal national GHG emissions 
targets.  Around 500 big polluting companies will need to buy and surrender to the 
Government a permit for every tonne of CO2-equivalent they produce.v  For the first 
three years, the charge for these permits will be fixed, initially at A$23 per tonne in 
2012 rising to A$25.4 in 2015 (Australian Government 2011, p.21).  Permits 
purchased at the fixed tax rate will be automatically surrendered and cannot be traded 
or banked.  The quantity of these permits available for purchase is unlimited. 
Starting from July 2015, the Government will enforce a cap on annual 
emissions and issue a limited number of emission permits accordingly.  Trading of 
permits will be allowed with access to international GHG emissions markets.  The 
CO2-equivalent tax charge will no longer be operative but rather a floating price will 
be set in the financial exchange markets.  This means that the CO2-equivalent tax is 
merely a transitional measure to pave the way for an ETS. 
 
Repeating the Design Failures of the CPRS 
The CEP is advanced as a pro-growth strategy for Australia in transition to a greener 
economy.  However, households and small businesses are not subject to any direct 
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obligations.  Emissions from agricultural activities, private transport and light 
commercial vehicles are excluded from the carbon pricevi.  The most energy-intensive, 
trade-exposed industries, including aluminium production and petroleum refining, 
will be provided with financial assistance equivalent to 94.5 percent shielding from 
the carbon price, and 66 percent shielding for the less intensive and less exposed, such 
as food production (Australian Government 2011, p. 55).  The assistance package sets 
levels of compensation for five years designed to support “future investment and 
growth in these industries” (Australian Government 2011, p.56).  This amounts to 
distortionary subsidies via free allocation of emission permits on the basis of 
grandfathering. 
All permits could have been designated for auctioning with the revenues going 
to the public purse, which would allow reduction of discretionary taxes or targeting at 
infrastructure change for GHG reduction.  However, the political preference has 
always been for giving away permits to big polluters (Spash 2010).  Worse, in this 
case, the permits are to be allocated on the basis of what polluters themselves claim, 
risking over-allocation and a collapse of the trading system with little or no abatement.  
This is exactly the situation arising under Phase I of the EU ETS where permits prices 
fell dramatically.  Grubb et al. (2005, p.135) have noted that European industry 
played a major role in weakening Phase I allocations bringing the credibility of 
emissions trading as an effective instrument into question. 
Despite Europe’s unsuccessful experiences, a permit system remains the 
priority of the Australian Labour Government.  One key reason is easy access to 
cheap international credits which allow avoidance of domestic abatement, i.e., carbon-
equivalent offsets.  Rich countries, where domestic abatement costs are relatively high, 
may purchase GHG credits from poorer countries, where abatement costs are lower.  
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These credits are based upon foreign projects which are disassociated from the 
domestic polluting source and are meant to either reduce GHG emissions or increase 
the capacity of a sink (such as forests) to absorb GHG emissions.  The projects must 
be beyond ‘business as usual’ otherwise there is no additional emissions reduction 
over what would happen anyway.  The CEP accepts GHG credits produced by offset 
projects falling under Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation 
associated with the Kyoto Protocol, but also leaves open accepting any other 
international units (Australian Government 2011 p.107). 
The idea of offsetting raises a range issues, such as physical equivalence, 
welfare compensation, the quality of the projects in meeting non-GHG social and 
environmental standards, and the exploitation of the poor (Lohmann 2006; Spash 
2010).  Under the previous CPRS there was scant regard by the ruling Labour Party 
for such issues and they even made this officially explicit stating that: “The 
Government does not consider it necessary to accept only those CERs that meet 
additional criteria, such as the Gold Standard … neither does it consider that it should 
assess the broader environmental and social impacts of CERs” (Australian 
Government 2008a, p.11-12).  Under the CEP this position is maintained with the 
Treasury indicating confidence in output growth in the energy-intensive industries due 
to their ability to buy cheap credits abroad (Treasury 2011, p.111). 
The Kyoto Protocol specifies offsets be supplementary to domestic action.  
This “supplementarity principle” is referred to in Article 6(1)(d), Article 12(3)(b) and 
Article 17, but all three Articles leave the exact meaning vague.  The Marrakesh 
Accordsvii,which elaborate on the rules for offsets, state that: “use of the mechanisms 
shall be supplemental to domestic action and that domestic action shall thus constitute 
a significant element of the effort made by each party included in Annex I to meet its 
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quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments”.  The CEP has included 
very lax restrictions allowing internationally sourced credits to meet up to 50 percent 
of a polluters compliance obligation (Australian Government 2011, p.107).  As a 
result the projected aggregate domestic contributions do not constitute ‘a significant 
element’.  Even with the carbon tax and ETS, domestic emissions are estimated to rise 
from 578 Mt CO2-equivalent to 612 Mt CO2-equivalent between 2010 and 2020 
(Treasury 2011, p.86).  To meet the prescribed 5 percent reduction target by 2020, 
Australia’s emissions need to fall by 152 Mt CO2-equivalent.  This reduction is 
estimated to include 58 Mt CO2-equivalent of domestic abatement and 94 Mt CO2-
equivalent international abatement (Australian Government 2011, p.91).  So rather 
than even 50 percent domestic abatement the planned amount is only 38 percent.  The 
failure to target substantive domestic reductions means the Australian Government is 
effectively planning to buy its way out. 
 
Windfall Profits for Big Polluters 
In recent times, non-environmental objectives have become a means of rolling back 
environmental protection in many countries and have dominated the GHG control 
debate in Australia.  Fears about economic recession have been key to this anti-
environmental position in recent years.  Corporations have exploited concerns by 
claiming, as they did for Rudd's proposed supertax on mining, that they will leave the 
country.  The Australian Workers’ Union has stressed that they would withdraw their 
support for the proposed CEP measures if jobs were threatened in emission-intensive 
industries (The Age 2011). 
These kind of arguments ignore the fact that current market prices are artificial, 
distorted and wasting resources from the economic efficiency perspective.  That the 
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current system prevents jobs being created in cleaner industries is easily neglected 
because those industries do not yet exist in any substantive form, and therefore do not 
have political or financial power in the system to match existing corporate and union 
interests.  The terms of the Australian debate are then dictated by powerful vested  
interest groups, which amongst others means those in the coal mining and resource 
extraction industries.  For example, the richest person in Australia, Gina Reinhart, is a 
mining magnate who has recently been buying into media outlets and has been linked 
to promotion of a new television programme fronted by a notorious climate sceptic 
(Milman 2011).  Judging from the proposed CEP "compensation packages" this 
industrial lobbying has been very effective. 
The CEP fully accepts the argument about fleeing industry and warns that 
without appropriate assistance arrangements applying GHG regulation in Australia 
before other countries could risk "carbon leakage", i.e., polluters relocating activities 
to countries with weaker or no such regulation.  A "Jobs and Competitiveness 
Program" has been designed to "reduce this risk".  Examples of eligible activities 
include aluminium production, steel manufacturing, pulp and paper manufacturing, 
glass making, cement production and petroleum refining (Australian Government 
2011, pp.53-54). 
The Australian scheme actually contradicts the standard theory of emission 
taxes in its treatment of energy-intensive industries.  Free allocation of emission 
permits to these industries will start from the initial ‘tax’ period in 2012.  In this 
period, holders of freely allocated permits will be allowed to sell unused permits to 
the Government at a fixed value (Australian Government 2011, p.103).  Also, excess 
freely allocated permits can be traded whereas those that are purchased, mainly by 
less energy-intensive industries, cannot (ibid).  This appears to be a better deal for the 
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big polluters than the former CPRS proposal under which they could only sell at a 
floating market price. 
Allocating permits for free to corporations provides them with an incentive to 
pass on the cost to consumers to reap windfall profits.  Even if an industry receives 
emission permits free of charge, the price of its products typically rise to reflect the 
value of the permits (Whitesell 2011).  This is because free permits have an 
opportunity cost: excess permits can be sold in the market.  By producing another unit 
of output, a firm gives up this option to cover the emissions from producing that unit.  
A firm would produce another unit of output only if it could sell that unit at a price 
high enough to recoup both the cost of production and the opportunity cost of 
surrendering the necessary permits.  Therefore, output prices rise to reflect the value 
of permits and consumers pay for the permits that firms get for free (Whitesell 2011).  
For example, under the EU ETS, Europe’s largest emitter, the German power 
company RWE, is estimated to have received a windfall of $US6.4 billion in the first 
three years of the system (Kantner 2008), and made €1.8 billion in one year by 
charging customers for permits it received for free (Lohmann 2006, p. 91). 
In markets prices go up and down.  The fixed value offer, however, precludes 
any downward adjustment (though upward adjustment has been scheduled to allow 
for inflation).  If a firm continues to produce and emit GHGs, it will raise output 
prices above the fixed value level and surrender permits; if it does not produce and 
discharge GHG emissions, it can sell the excess permits at the guaranteed rate at no 
risk or cost.  The fixed value mechanism removes market uncertainty and allows 
holders of free permits to earn windfall profits whether they curb their emissions 
levels or not (unless there is additional intervention e.g. by a utility price regulator).  
Under a normal pollution tax firms would be obliged to pay a tax or reduce pollution.  
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In the fixed value period of the CEP highly polluting firms are paid and have no 
obligation to limit emission. 
 
Permanent tax cuts under volatile prices: A budgetary risk 
Emission trading is far more susceptible to opportunistic market operations and 
speculators leading to highly volatile prices (Spash 2010).  It is therefore harder to 
maintain non-declining cash inflows to support a fixed amount of revenue recycling.  
Revenues from a pollution tax are normally expected to be more stable than from an 
ETS because the government sets the tax rate not the market.  The quantity of 
emissions is then the main determinant of revenues.  Once the tax rate has been raised 
sufficiently to reduce emissions to the target level the revenues should be stable.  
Other things remaining the same, the main concern with respect to revenue volatility 
comes from unforeseen political adjustments to the tax rate (OECD 2009).  A GHG 
tax mechanism based on a fixed or increasing rate is then generally regarded as a 
better self-funding basis for committing to new long-term tax cuts and expenditures. 
Once the CEP moves into the ETS the revenues would depend on the trade 
price of permits and be subject to fluctuations in the international GHG markets.  
Revenue stability would then be lower than under a genuine GHG tax.  Despite this, 
the Australian Government is promising a package of budget commitments.  The 
household assistance package will require 63 percent of the projected revenues from 
the sale of permits, and “will be permanent and increase over time” (Australian 
Government 2011, p.39).  Job support measures, in the form of free permits, are 
guaranteed for several years and subject to regulatory review afterwards.  Once 
instigated, terminating the free allocation arrangements is likely to prove politically 
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difficult because free permits soon become viewed as a right protected by powerful 
vested interest groups. 
Fiscal forecasts undertaken by the Government have already revealed that the 
CEP needs support from other tax sources.  As shown in Table 1, the net fiscal impact 
will be positive for just one year of the tax period.  The net impact is estimated to be a 
cost to the Treasury of approximately A$4 billion after the ETS commences, 
suggesting a perpetual deficit from the scheme.  The CEP includes provisions for free 
permit allocation that create wealth for some powerful industries, which amount to 
over A$9.2 billionviii, or 38 percent of the revenues from selling permits.  The number 
of free permits as a payoff for polluters may grow due to their ability to exert political 
pressure.  This constitutes a potential persistent downward trend on the size of net 
revenues. 
In addition, the revenue estimates may be an overestimation.  The Treasury 
(2011, p.89) assumes that carbon prices rise by 5 percent per year plus inflation from 
the start of the ETS to 2050.  Yet the prices are set to follow international markets 
through linking and that means exposure to great volatility is inevitable, as in any 
international commodity market.  Experience from the schemes in both Europe and 
New South Wales affirm the possibility of sudden price collapse.  Under Phase I of 
the EU ETS, the trade price of emission permits fell from €30 to €12 from April to 
May 2006 and eventually it reached a low of €0.1 (Skjærseth and Wettestad 2008, 
p.276, 280).  The New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme commenced 
in 2003 as a carbon ETS; the trade prices of permits peaked at A$14 in mid-2006 
down to A$3 in the first half of 2009 (IPART 2010, p. 65). 
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Table 1.  Estimated fiscal impact of the Clean Energy Plan 
 Fiscal Impact 
(millions of Australian dollars) 
 
2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 Total
Revenue from sale of permits 0 7740 8140 8590 24470
Fuel tax credit reductions 0 570 620 670 1860
Revenue from application of 
other measures 
0 290 320 320 930
Governance -78 -90 -106 -107 -382
Clean Energy Finance 
Corporation 
-2 -21 -467 -455 -944
Land and biodiversity 
measures 
-69 -131 -506 -489 -1194
Energy security and 
transformation 
-1009 -1 -1003 -1042 -3054
Support for jobs -26 -3017 -3475 -3773 -10291
Household assistance measures -1533 -4196 -4802 -4825 -15356
Total impact -2716 1144 -1279 -1110 -3961
Adapted from Australian Government (2011, p.131) 
 
Price plunges can be avoided by setting a price floor (Avi-Yonah and 
Uhlmann 2009, Pizer 2001). The CEP has such a built-in price control mechanism to 
prevent the carbon price from falling below A$15.  In addition, a price ceiling is to be 
set at A$20 higher than the expected international carbon price at the start of the ETS 
in July 2015.  Both are expected to increase but are also subject to regulatory review 
after three years.  Clearly the need for control of the vagaries of market prices in this 
way shows the fallacy of the argument that markets are the best means of regulation 
and can be left to their own devices.  The ETS is of necessity nothing like an 
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unregulated market.  In Europe failure to control market volatility, fraud and 
speculators has proven extremely expensive and raised awareness of the need to 
tightly regulated the market, which raises the costs of the whole mechanism and 
removes its supposed free market qualities (Spash 2010). 
 
Prices and technical innovations 
Even if permit prices increase in real terms, the price signal may not constitute an 
effective driver of technical change toward emissions reduction as neoclassical 
economists suggest.  A frequently stated perspective is that markets enable a demand 
pull as prices create a demand-driven, profit-based incentive for the private sector to 
invest in new, low-emission innovations (Newell 2010).  It has been taken as a strong 
case for "putting a price on carbon" as the Australian government attempts to deploy 
such a supposedly market-based approach.  Higher GHG prices are expected to give 
“economic impetus” to the research and development of less-polluting modes of 
production and consumption (Australian Government 2011, p.32).  The fundamental 
principle is to “harness the power of markets” to kick-start the desired transformation 
of the economy.  The standard economic concept that prices induce technical change 
is embraced. 
Yet the neoclassical economic approach has not been very useful for 
describing the process of technological innovation for GHG mitigation (IPCC 2001).  
Contrary to standard assumptions, Mokyr (1991) argues that technological change is 
the consequence of a combination of highly stochastic disturbances and a 
deterministic selection mechanism.  Basic innovations create new techniques and tend 
to be abrupt and discontinuous, whereas incremental innovations refine and improve 
the basic.  Incremental innovations respond to incentives in a predictable way and are 
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sensitive to factor prices.  Standard economic theory describes the incremental rather 
than the basic (Mokyr 1991).  Substantial cuts in GHG emissions require removing 
fossil fuels from industrial countries and incremental innovations are clearly not 
enough (OECD 2010). 
Raising the cost of GHGs would be more effective in inducing the deployment 
of ‘on-the-shelf’ technologies than those that require further basic research, such as 
carbon emission-free technologies (Galiana and Green 2010).  For this type of 
technology, “the development costs may be greater, the time horizons longer, the 
uncertainty larger and the supply of investors small” (OECD 2010, p.83).  Firms are 
not constantly aware of all potential opportunities to invest in innovation and 
therefore fail to fully optimize with respect to their research and development budget 
(OECD 2010).  The initial three-year fixed value period of the CEP merely provides 
short-term certainty that is not likely to be a strong inducement to undertake even 
medium term incremental innovations, let alone long-term, risky and uncertain 
investments in the development of new technologies. 
The CEP in part recognises this problem by including separate funds for 
investment in cleaner technologies.  A Clean Energy Finance Corporation will be 
established to invest in businesses seeking funds to develop renewable energy and 
energy efficiency technologies.  The Corporation will be commercially oriented and 
chaired by a banker.  Yet, this raises concerns as to how costs and benefits will be 
evaluated for long-term, risky investments in basic innovations for emission reduction 
that tend to yield limited short-term profits and non-financial environmental and 
social returns. 
An Energy Security Fund will be set up to assist highly polluting electricity 
generators replace their high emission facilities with cleaner technologies.  This in 
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effect rewards past pollution activities.  It involves free allocation of emission permits 
plus cash equivalent to A$5.5 billion (nominal) over 6 years (Australian Government 
2011, p.75).  The recipients will be free to re-invest the money for private gain at 
public expense without creating any public assets. 
Any positive aspect of these two initiatives are at risk of being more than 
offset by the adverse incentives created by the free allocations of permits.  The over 
A$9 billion in subsidies given to major GHG emitters under the proposed ETS is 
more than double the amount allocated to the two clean technology initiatives (see 
Table 1).  Free permits give less incentive to innovate than auctioned ones or taxes 
(Fischer 2003).  As the free permits are used to support growth in energy-intensive 
industries, they are effectively a form of energy subsidy which undoes the incentives 
of an increasing GHG cost. 
 
Discussion 
According to the Australian Government (2011, p.v) the proposed CEP scheme, 
combined with its Renewable Energy Target, will invest A$20 billion in renewable 
energy.  In addition, the commercially oriented Clean Energy Finance Corporation 
will be allocated $10 billion to invest in renewable energy and innovative 
technologies to cut pollution.  The Australian Renewable Energy Agency will 
administer A$3.2 billion.  On the surface this appears like recognition of a need for 
substantial change, and a large investment, but is it really? 
The outcome of this A$33 billion allocation is expected to be that "the 
equivalent of 20 per cent of Australia’s electricity will come from renewable sources 
by 2020" (Ibid).  As current renewable electricity production is 8 percent (Australian 
Government 2011 p.71), this means just a 12 percent increase in renewable energy 
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production.  The Australian taxpayer will not gain any assets for this outlay because 
all monies are going to fund private enterprise, commercial interests, and 
corporations.  In addition to this A$33 billion a further A$14 billion appears to be 
allocated to the worst polluters.  The billions to be spent on paying the coal industry 
to close its most polluting plants will be reinvested by that industry.  They will also be 
able to plead for money and cheap loans under the security fund.  So the public sector 
will be financing and underwriting private profits. 
The whole scheme is trapped in neo-liberal market rhetoric and an 
unwillingness to regulate while implementing a complex and heavily regulated system 
of benefits and allowances for polluters.  We are told that: "A carbon price is the most 
environmentally effective and economically efficient way to reduce pollution." 
(Australian Government 2011 p.21).  Yet what are the expectations of the scheme?  
According to the CEP the types of changes a "carbon price" can deliver are: 
• promoting more gas-fired or renewable electricity generation 
• converting coal-fired boilers to gas-fired boilers in manufacturing plants, 
commercial buildings and hospitals 
• making energy-efficient buildings more attractive to tenants 
• providing an incentive for households and businesses to use energy more 
wisely 
• prompting innovation in technology to reduce pollution from existing 
processes 
• encouraging chemical plants to install scrubbers to reduce nitrous oxide 
emissions 
• encouraging the installation of more efficient motors in industry 
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• encouraging the capture and use or flaring of emissions from mining and 
gas extraction. (Australian Government 2011 p.22-23) 
This emphasises lots of "encouraging", and some "prompting", "promoting" and 
"providing", without any certainty that any change will materialise.  There is also 
maintenance of fossil fuel dependence via an inefficient conversion of gas to 
electricity which is expected to increase by over 200 per cent by 2050 (Australian 
Government 2011, p.24); hardly a shift to sustainability.  Direct regulation is much 
more effective than complex attempts to create artificial markets and rely upon highly 
volatile commodity prices.  Best available technology regulation is the best way to get 
scrubbers installed.  Setting energy efficient standards for products and housing is the 
most effective way to change energy intensive domestic consumption.  Effectiveness 
is just not on the "encouraging" approaches agenda. 
The efficiency claim is also unproven and unprovable.  This has been 
explained at length by Spash (2010) for ETS applications to climate change.  
Basically economists cannot substantiate the claims of their theoretical approaches 
which do not reflect real markets or their operation.  They cannot predict the impacts 
of their schemes on future prices and this is especially the case for an all pervasive 
charge or price being introduced across all products in the economy e.g., changing 
energy prices.  Worse, what is really being dressed-up as efficiency is buying cheap 
international permits from exploiting the poor and from providers who do not enforce 
the same labour, social, environmental, welfare, health and safety standards as found 
domestically.  In any other areas this would be deemed unfair competition and 
unethical behaviour e.g., buying cheap products from sweat shops or infant labourers. 
Rather than openly and directly addressing the need for domestic restructuring 
(both societal and economic) the trend in the current GHG control debate is to avoid 
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the issue by pretending that simple unregulated markets will create a price that can 
solve everything.  Such neo-liberalism strongly opposes taxes.  Some go so far as to 
cite GHG taxes as having become an outrageous political proposition: “Touch it and 
die” (Harrison 2010, p. 522). 
As experience shows, governments in designing and implementing a pollution 
tax rarely follow the textbook approach and, unsurprisingly, are highly responsive to 
power relationships in society.  The use of the revenues from pollution taxes to 
compensate polluters can easily destroy the incentives meant to be created and allow 
polluters to continue business as usual (Enevoldsen 2005).  Weyant (1998) doubts the 
ability of governments to use the revenues in an efficient or appropriate way.  
Evidence suggests that historically the revenues are often earmarked towards 
distortionary projects or returned to the general budget, rather than recycled (Hahn 
2009) and this limits the expected double dividend (Bovenberg and Goulder 1996). 
In a neo-liberal political climate making a GHG tax acceptable appears to 
require assuring the electorate and industry of minimal negative economic impacts or 
even positive growth.  The CEP is no different in this respect and cites Treasury 
modelling estimates that state under the (CO2-equivalent) carbon price: incomes grow 
16 percent by 2019-20 and 54 percent by 2050 and 1.6 million jobs are created by 
2020 (Australian Government 2011, p.24).  From an environmental perspective, this 
pro-growth position appears highly problematic.  How is the absolute expansion in the 
scale of the, basically unrestructured, economy going to prevent increases in material 
and energy throughput, which are directly responsible for resource extraction, waste 
and pollution going into the environment?  There is no real vision here of a 
sustainable economy, decoupling economic activity from fossil fuels or assessment of 
the basis upon which current economic growth occurs and is being sustained.  There 
27 
 
is quite simply no way that economic growth as envisioned by the Treasury is 
compatible with avoiding increased GHG emissions.  Of course this is not actually the 
aim of the CEP.  The only real aim of the entire scheme is to reduce the rate of GHG 
emissions increases rather than reduce their absolute level.  The Australian 
Government's plans have little relevance for contributing towards the stabilisation of 
GHGs in the upper atmosphere let alone at a level scientists state would avoid human 
induced climate change. 
What is really required to move Australia off its coal fired electricity 
generation and avoid substitution by other polluting sources such as nuclear or gas?  
One example is the report by Beyond Zero Emission (2010), a not-for-profit 
organisation associated with researchers from the University of Melbourne.  Their 
research shows that Australia can achieve 100 percent renewable electricity 
generation within a decade using technology that is commercially available now.  
This would totally replace base load power currently sourced from fossil fuels.  Wind 
power and solar thermal with molten salt storage have the capacity to supply 60 
percent and 40 percent of Australia’s electricity respectively.  They estimate this will 
require an investment of A$370 billion over ten years, stated to be equivalent to 
costing A$8 per household per week.  They project that the investment will generate a 
stimulus to the Australian economy that is equivalent to 3 percent of GDP over ten 
years and create permanent jobs around four times higher than currently exist in the 
domestic fossil fuel sector (Beyond Zero Emissions, 2010). Converting the 92 percent 
of Australian electricity not generated from renewable energy is technically feasible 
with existing technology and could be funded by a real GHG tax.  In return for their 
investment the public could have a nationally owned electricity generating sector with 
public benefits in perpetuity. 
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If Australia wants to immediately set about cutting GHG emissions the 
obvious source to address is the largest.  Stationary energy production from coal and 
gas accounts for approximately 50 percent of Australia's emissions (Australian 
Government 2008).  Electricity generation is the largest part of that.  Going beyond 
this policy would require looking at emissions from agriculture and land clearance (27 
percent) and road transport (14 percent).  More generally, the level of consumption 
and its energy dependence would need to be addressed.  This means changing 
production and consumptions patterns.  At the same time synthetic greenhouse gases 
could be ban outright.  Much could be achieved within a decade but this would 
require a political will which is clearly absent. 
 
Conclusions 
A pollution tax is meant to impose a cost per unit of emissions on the producer.  
Polluters should then pay for emissions they continue to release plus the cost of any 
emissions control they undertake.  Traditional economic theory holds that an optimal 
tax should be set at the point where the marginal social cost of emissions is equal to 
the marginal social benefit.  The textbook approach assumes marginal cost and benefit 
functions are complete, continuous and known.  The idealized economic planner is an 
all-knowing, all-powerful guardian of the public interest unswayed by special interest 
pleadings, and would carefully calculate the point where the marginal costs of 
intervention just offset the benefits and then set a tax rate to maximize efficiency.  In 
this idealised world, firms are price takers with no market or political power.  The 
design of a pollution tax is assumed to be driven by environmental considerations in 
light of economic theory immune from political influences. 
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In reality non-environmental political and economic considerations dominate 
environmental regulation and its design.  This is especially true in countries with the 
biggest fossil fuel dependencies and unquestioning support for modern consumerist 
lifestyles.  That mainstream economics is unable to explain the political economy in 
which we live is one contributing factor as to why regulation using market-based 
approaches has repeatedly failed to achieve any substantial GHG emissions reductions.  
Economics must become more realistic about modern capitalism and the role large 
corporations play and the dangers they pose to democratic governance. 
All regulatory and public policy instruments are subject to political negotiation 
and can be manipulated.  Different instruments inherently favour different societal 
actors and vested interests.  Clearly while taxes favour government they can also be 
watered down, counterproductive and ineffectual.  Levels of compensation to 
polluting industries can exceed acceptable standards of both efficiency and fairness.  
Substantial concessions in the form of tax exemptions, reductions and rebates to 
maintain momentum for material growth may appear in design proposals and be 
justified as being necessary in hard economic times.  Highly polluting industries may 
then be able to gain more concessions than the less polluting ones.  Thus GHG taxes 
can become primarily targeted at securing votes and jobs, and not only fail to 
correspond to textbook recommendations but also fail to achieve the promised 
internalization of social and environmental costs. 
In proposing a temporary CO2-equivalent tax, Australia is developing its own 
model departing from some of the basic principles that define a pollution tax.  
Correctly designed a GHG emission tax could provide more pollution-control-cost 
certainty than an ETS and have greater capacity for revenue recycling.  As the 
proposed GHG tax is a short prelude to an ETS any such certainty will absent after 
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three years.  If instead the scheme restricts prices under the ETS this would be an 
open admission that such markets are not actually all that marvellous after all.  At 
present the stability of revenues is questionable while committing to funding 
substantial tax cuts and expenditures on a continuing basis.  A deliberate deficit 
scheme might be justified by a serious plan to restructure the economy—moving to 
100 percent renewable electricity generation in a decade—but such a vision appears 
absent. 
What makes the scheme superficial and farcical is the scale of concessions to 
industry.  This has reached a point where the basic logic of the Pigouvian tax appears 
reversed.  Big polluters are rewarded and subsidised.  Australia has invented the 
'polluter gets paid' principle to replace the 'polluter pays' principle, and the worse you 
pollute the more you get rewarded.  Less energy-intensive industries will be penalised 
by having to purchase non-tradable permits at a fixed value, whereas the more energy-
intensive industries are bestowed permits for free and allowed to sell them. 
What Australia exemplifies is how the rich and powerful polluters have been 
able to take control of the debate on human induced climate change, and manipulate it 
to their considerable financial advantage, while pretending to be the victims of an 
environmental hoax.  The real problems of restructuring the economy away from 
fossil fuels can be solved with technology available today, especially in a country rich 
in potential wind, solar thermal energy and other renewables.  Australia has many 
advantages for making an environmental transition of the economy.  There is no need 
to invest billions in developing new markets, new technologies or new funds for 
financial speculation.  What is required is to take-on and replace the existing 
organisations which hold power and employ heavily polluting resources and 
technologies.  Mainstream economics clearly identifies such organisations as creating 
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private profits by shifting social and environmental damages on to others.  This would 
seem to be a straight forward case for government intervention and regulation in the 
public interest.  Choosing the best technical solutions and the means to pay for policy 
implementation are relatively straight forward.  However, what is far from straight 
forward is gaining and maintaining public support for changing the current economic 
structure, and the course of society.  Just as difficult is finding a sufficient number of 
those in the establishment with the political will, and courage, to seriously challenge 
and regulate the most powerful players.  As long as the majority of those in power 
hold high stakes in the persistence of organisations built-upon social cost-shifting, 
there will be few environmental regulations with real teeth and more regulatory sheep 
in wolves' clothing. 
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i In 2009, Australia overtook the USA (see 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/11/18/2745751.htm).  Amongst OECD 
countries Australia is the highest per capita emitter of all GHGs combined (see 
http://www.garnautreview.org.au/chp7.htm). 
ii Australia only ratified the treaty in 2008 after a change of national government from 
Howard's conservatives to Rudd's labour party. 
iii GHG taxation tends to be regressive as it is likely to disproportionately affect 
lower-income households than the higher-income. 
iv An emission trading system in which all emission permits are freely allocated 
generates no revenue for government.  Instead, money flows from polluters to 
organizations who receive the permits.  Free allocation of permits has been a common 
practice of existing ETS design and implementation (Spash 2010). 
v Under the CPRS 1000 firms were to be targeted. 
vi Australian farmers will not be required to pay for the GHG pollution created by their 
agricultural activities, but will be involved in the ETS as a provider of carbon-
equivalent credits that can be sold to companies with liabilities under the ETS to 
offset their pollution. 
 
vii The Marrakesh Accords are the aggregate Decisions (2/CP.7 through to 24/CP.7) of 
the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC set down in its seventh session, held at 
Marrakesh, Morocco from 29 October to 10 November 2001.  Those decisions were 
adopted in Montreal in November 2005. 
viii This refers to the projected expenses allotted to the ‘Jobs and Competitiveness 
Program’ (not shown in Table 1) in the flexible price period which is devoted to 
energy-intensive industries.  It is the largest component falling under the ‘Support for 
jobs’ category in Table 1.  The second largest item ‘Clean Technology Program’, 
which is designated to support less energy-intensive industries, is allocated only 
A$717 million. 
